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"You are saved," cried Captain Delano, more and more astonished
and pained; "you are saved: what has cast such a shadow upon
you?1
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race
and then say, "You are free to compete with all the others," and still
justly believe that you have been completely fair. z
The politically potent phrase "affirmative action' 3 has been
loosely defined as "[any] attempts to bring members of under-
represented groups ... into a higher degree of participation in some
beneficial program. ''4 However, like so many others,5 this definition
belies both the myriad forms which affirmative action may take6 and
1. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 1 (Random House 1972) (1952) (quoting HERMAN
MELVILLE, BENITO CERENO 183 (1842)).
2. THm NEGRO IN TwErrrrm CENTuRY AMERICA 226 (John Hope Franklin and Isidore
Starr, eds., 1967) (quoting Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Remarks of the President
at Howard University, Washington D.C., June 4, 1965).
3. Other terms used to describe this practice include "reverse discrimination," "preferen-
tial treatment," "quotas," and "hiring goals." MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
JusnrcE 42-43 (1991). However, not all phrases are created equal. Robert K. Fullinwider notes
that "[t]he terms involved in the ... controversy are especially treacherous," THE REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY 10 (1980), immediately infusing any discussion about such prac-
tices with strong political and moral overtones. For a closer examination of the power of lan-
guage in the debate over affirmative action, see Philip L. Fetzer, "Reverse Discrimination": The
Political Use of Language, 12 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 212 (1993) (The phrase reverse discrimination is
a "covert political term which should be removed from the vocabulary of any serious academi-
cian or layperson.").
4. ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 42 (citing KENr GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND RE-
VERSE DISCRIMINATION 17 (1983)).
5. Other attempts to define the concept produce equally nebulous results. See REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION 3 (Barry R. Gross ed. 1977) (defining same as "giving special or preferred
treatment to persons who are members of... groups ... against whose membership generally
unjust discrimination was or is being practiced."). See also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, TIM AL-
cHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 121 (1991) (Affirmative action is "an act of verification and vision,
an act of social as well as professional responsibility.").
6. For example, a Congressional Research Service Report requested by Senator Robert
Dole lists over 150 federal executive orders and statutory and regulatory provisions which
"grants [sic] a preference to individuals on the basis of race, sex, national origin or ethnic back-
ground." 141 CONG. REc. S3929 - 4001 (daily ed. March 15, 1995). These regulations affect
1
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the colossally controversial political, philosophical, and constitutional
debate it has spawned.7 "Few constitutional questions in recent his-
tory have stirred as much debate" as affirmative action,8 and since the
inception of both policy and phrase with President Kennedy's Execu-
tive Order 10925,9 both American society and the Supreme Court
have struggled to reconcile the preferential policies of race-based "af-
firmative action" with Justice Harlan's often quoted characterization
of our Constitution as "color blind."'"
Now, almost thirty years after affirmative action programs first
received a constitutional stamp of approval," political discourse has
turned to an examination of the efficacy and usefulness of such pro-
grams. Recent executive' 2 and legislative 3 interest in the scope, func-
tion and effect of federal affirmative action programs mirrors state
concerns over the effects of preferential admission and hiring policies
on non-minority constituencies. 4
"close to a fifth of the nation's total economic activity." Harvey Berkman, Many 'Tentacles' to
Race-Based Federal Policies, NAT'L L.J., April 24, 1995, at Al, col. 1.
7. The most recent (and most volatile) battle in the war over affirmative action is being
fought in California. Pete Wilson's recent successful move to eliminate the use of affirmative
action admissions programs within the University of California system has stirred the fire there.
See Margot Hornblower, Taking It All Back: At Pete Wilson's Urging, the University of Califor-
nia Says No to Racial Preferences, TME, July 31, 1995, at 34. Also see generally RACIAL PREF.
ERENCE AND RACIAL JusTcE: THm NEw AFrsRMATnrE ACTION CONTROVERSY (Russell Nieli
ed. 1991) ("[D]ominant opinion on civil rights is no longer uniform, and is split on whether
preferential employment on the basis of race and ethnic group is a proper response to discrimi-
nation and disadvantage.").
8. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 350 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, Tam CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 28 (1990).
10. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a fully devel-
oped historical and political analysis of the "color blind theory," see ANDREw KULL, Tam COLOR
BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992).
11. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See infra notes 49-59 and
accompanying text for a fuller analysis.
12. Note President Clinton's "Affirmative Action Review Report," released shortly after
Adarand, reaffirming the need for affirmative action programs. DAILY LAB. REP. July 20, 1995,
page 5.
13. Note also Senator Bob Dole's rebuttal to President Clinton's affirmative action report,
see supra note 12, indicating his intent to introduce legislation which would "get the Federal
Government out of the group preference business." 141 CoNG. REC. S10260 (daily ed. July 19,
1995). Making good on that promise, Senator Dole introduced Senate Bill 1085, which would
effectively prohibit discrimination and preferential treatment on the basis of race, color, national
origin, or sex in federal contracts, employment, and programs. S. 1085, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
14. Particularly California, where the popularly known "California Civil Rights Initiative"
proposes to amend the California constitution to eliminate the use of preferential treatment by
the state or its political subdivisions. Assembly Constitutional Amendment Number 2, intro-
duced Dec. 5,1994. Also note the ironic and perhaps prophetic dismantling of affirmative action
admission programs in the University of California system. See Hornblower, supra note 7.
2
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As is often the case, heightened political scrutiny of this contro-
versial issue encouraged closer judicial examination,'15 and the
Supreme Court recently reconsidered which level of judicial scrutiny
should apply to beneficial federal race-based classifications analyzed
under the equal protection provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.' 6 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'7 a sharply di-
vided Court revisited and rejected as unworkable and untenable the
application of intermediate scrutiny to "benign" federal racial classifi-
cations as forwarded in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.8 Citing the
need for "skepticism," "consistency," and "congruence"' 9 when re-
viewing all governmentally imposed racial classifications, the five jus-
tice majority in Adarand looked to the standard of review applied in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.2" and imposed strict scrutiny as
the proper standard of review for all race-based classifications,
whether beneficial or detrimental2 ' and whether imposed by federal,
state, or municipal governmental entities.'
However simple the holding, Adarand's effects will be far more
pervasive than the words employed suggest. Adarand not only de-
parts from case law distinguishing federal affirmative action measures
from similar state programs, but also places the status of all federal
affirmative action programs in constitutional limbo. 23 The majority's
limited discussion also raises questions regarding the application of
strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs.24 Therefore,
section two of this note will discuss the Supreme Court's affirmative
15. Much like the abortion controversy in the late 1960's and early 1970's. See JAMES C.
Mor, ABORTnON n. AMERCA: TmE OIGINS AND EVOLUITON OF NATIONAL POUcy 250-263
(1978).
16. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]o State ... shall deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The Fifth Amendment has no equivalent language, but the Court has interpreted the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Amendment to incorporate an equal protection component. See infra notes
40-108 and accompanying text.
17. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
18. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
19. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
20. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
21. Throughout this paper, the terms "beneficial" or "benign" denote policies which grant
benefits or preferences based on the race of the recipient, such as those at issue in Adarand. The
words "detrimental" or "harmful" describe those laws and policies which deny benefits or pref-
erences solely on the basis of race. This author acknowledges the controversial nature of the use
of this language, and also acknowledges the suggestions of those who believe affirmative action
programs are more harmful than helpful to its beneficiaries. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at
2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
22. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
23. See discussion infra part IV.
24. See discussion infra part IV.
1996]
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action jurisprudence prior to Adarand, section three will analyze the
majority's reasoning, and section four will discuss Adarand's impact
on the status of existing federal affirmative action programs and
jurisprudence.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT: FROM No
SCRUTINY TO STucr ScRUTINY
Arguing about what standard of review should apply in a given
case "may strike some as a lawyers'[sic] quibble over words."5 It is,
however, a vitally important argument; one which may in the equal
protection context ultimately decide the fate of one's case.26 Over the
years, the Supreme Court has established a treble-tiered framework
under which all laws and regulations challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment must be analyzed.27 The least stringent standard of re-
view, rational basis review,28 historically has operated as a judicial
rubber stamp for most social and economic classifications imposed by
a legislature. 29 However, application of strict scrutiny"0 analysis to a
governmental classification has the opposite effect; few classifications
escape the narrowly drawn strict scrutiny test intact,3' leading one
25. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 610 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
26. "The standard of review establishes whether and when the Court and Constitution allow
the Government to employ racial classifications. A lower standard signals that the government
may resort to racial distinctions more readily." Id.
27. See 2 ROTUNDA, ET AL, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCE-
DURE § 18.3 (1986 & Supp. 1991).
28. Rational basis or low level scrutiny review was first established by the Court in F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). Rational basis review requires that a "clas-
sification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ... difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 415. More recent articulations of the test simply note that
under rational basis review, "[l]egislative classifications are valid unless they bear no rational
relationship to the state's objectives." New York Transit Auth. v. Beazar, 440 U.S. 568, 592
(1979) (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)).
29. See generally 2 ROTUNDA, ET AL, supra note 27, at 324 ("The Court will not grant any
significant review of legislative decisions to classify persons in terms of general economic legisla-
tion."). But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (reviewing and
invalidating denial of special use permit for operation of group home under rational basis
review).
30. "To pass muster [under strict scrutiny review], a challenged governmental action must
be closely related to a compelling governmental interest." Tim OxFoRD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 845 (Kermit L. Hall ed. 1992) [hereinafter OxFoRD
COMPANION] (internal quotations omitted). The Court usually states the test as whether the
classification is "precisely tailored," Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment) or "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Croson, 488
U.S. at 507.
31. Prior to Croson, very few classifications satisfied strict scrutiny analysis. The most re-
cent pre-Croson classifications to survive were those requiring the relocation of Japanese-Ameri-
cans during World War II. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
4
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constitutional scholar to describe the test as "strict in theory, but fatal
in fact."' 32 Intermediate scrutiny,33 the middle tier within the frame-
work, developed as an alternative test primarily applied to classifica-
tions based on gender;' of the three tests, only intermediate scrutiny
truly operates as a test. 5
Although all legislative classifications challenged under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection provisions36 must pass
Constitutional muster under one of these three tests, often the most
critical question posed to the Court involves which of the three tests
should apply to the classification at issue.37 This threshold question
comprises the core controversy in the Court's struggle over the consti-
tutionality of affirmative action programs.38 An examination of the
Court's splintered decisions in this area indicates that the historical
and political climate in which the question is asked often will fore-
shadow the answer.
Initially, for the Supreme Court, affirmative action was literally a
moot point. In DeFunis v. Odegaard,39 one of the Court's first forays
into the constitutionality of affirmative action programs,4 ° the Court
failed to reach the merits of the case. DeFunis's equal protection
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Since Croson, however, courts seem to have relaxed the
standards for beneficial racial classifications. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12; Metro Broadcasting,
497 U.S. at 566.
32. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term - Foreword- In Search of Evolving
Doctrine in a Changing Court A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HA.v. L. RE-v. 1, 8
(1972).
33. Classifications will withstand intermediate judicial scrutiny if they are substantially re-
lated to an important governmental interest. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
34. See 2 ROTUNDA, ET AL, supra note 27, at 326.
35. Id. at 329 (intermediate scrutiny has "some ad hoc quality."). See also Matthews v.
Lucas, describing the middle tier test as "not a toothless one." 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
36. After some confusion regarding the extent of the Fifth Amendment's protection of
rights similar to those protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, see generally Adarand, 115
S. Ct. at 2106-08, the Court ultimately determined that the Fifth Amendment has an equal pro-
tection component. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Court there noted though
"'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due
process of law'. . . it would be unthinkable that the ... Constitution would impose a lesser duty
on the federal government." Id. at 499-500. See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's
Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REv. 541 (1977).
37. Particularly where the Court is faced with a classification which may not be easily pige-
onholed as an economic or social classification. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456, 459-460
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464,
468 (1981) ("[T]he traditional minimum rationality test takes on a somewhat 'sharper focus'
where gender-based classifications are challenged.").
38. See discussion infra notes 40-108 and accompanying text.
39. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
40. See also United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). The
Court there upheld the use of numerical race targets in legislative redistricting as a means of
ensuring fair representation, as long as such use did not unduly burden the rights of whites.
5
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challenge of beneficial race-based admission policies at the University
of Washington Law School was thwarted by a per curiam opinion
holding the controversy moot41 under Article III of the Constitution.42
The Court found that DeFunis's admission to and impending gradua-
tion from Washington's School of Law eliminated his need for relief.43
Further, though the nature of the question presented appeared "capa-
ble of repetition, yet evading review,"'44 the Court determined the pos-
sibility of a timely review would exist as long as the challenged
admissions programs remained in place.45 The DeFunis majority's use
of "passive virtues"46 to avoid the ultimate issue of the program's con-
stitutionality split the Court47 and spawned much critical commen-
tary.48 More importantly, DeFunis indicated the Court's reluctance to
deal with the still novel idea.
However, the controversial nature of affirmative action programs
ensured the Court could not dodge the issue forever. Four years later
the Court again considered the constitutionality of a race-based pref-
erential admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause.4 9 Al-
len Bakke, a white applicant denied admission to the University of
California at Davis Medical School, challenged the school's use of a
special admissions program for minorities which effectively excluded
white applicants from competing for sixteen openings.50 A crucial
swing opinion written by Justice Powell allowed the Court to deliver
one of the most politically savvy decisions of the late twentieth cen-
tury. In Bakke, the Court simultaneously held that though considera-
tion of a person's race or ethnic background as a "plus" in admissions
41. Mootness occurs when "the issue that is being litigated has become resolved in one way
or another, thus leaving the plaintiff with no current complaint." OXFORD COMPANION, supra
note 30, at 562.
42. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 319-20.
43. Id. at 317.
44. Id. at 318-19 (citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
45. Id. at 319.
46. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term - Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961).
47. The decision split 5-4, with Justices Brennan, White, Douglas, and Marshall dissenting.
Douglas actually reached the merits and found no violation of the Equal Protection Clause on
the record as presented. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 344.
48. See generally ROBERT M. O'NEn., DISCRIMINATING AOAINsT DISCRIMINATION: PREF.
EREN- AL ADMIssIONS AND THE DeFunis Case (1975); IvOR KRAFT, DEFuNIS v. ODEOAARD:
RACE, MERIT, AND m FouRTEENTh AMENDMENT (1976). For a critical analysis of the Court's
use of Article III passive virtues, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues' -
A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
49. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
50. Id. at 275. The program was established in an attempt to secure admissions for disad-
vantaged students generally; in practice, however, only members of certain minority groups were
admitted under the special admissions plan. Id. at 275-76.
[Vol. 31:611
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decisions and policies theoretically does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection, the special admissions
program challenged in Bakke was unconstitutional as applied.5'
Though Bakke has correctly been considered a watershed deci-
sion,5 2 what the Court did not do in Bakke is as significant as what it
did. First, the Court did not reach consensus on the proper standard
of review applicable to voluntarily adopted state affirmative action
programs. Only Justice Powell considered preferential race-based
polices subject to strict judicial scrutiny;53 the four justices he joined to
allow beneficial racial classifications clearly supported application of
intermediate scrutiny,54 and the other four justices refused to reach
the Constitutional issue. 5 Further, unlike the four Justices he joined
to invalidate California's program,56 Powell's opinion effectively lim-
ited the holding to programs similar to the one at issue in Bakke. His
concern focused only on the means by which the program attempted
to boost minority enrollment; California's plan only failed strict scru-
tiny analysis because it "prefer[red] the designated minority groups at
the expense of other individuals who [were] totally foreclosed from
competition for the.., special admissions seats in every... class."157
Under the more palatable "Harvard Plan," Powell noted that:
The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another
candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will
not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply
because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname....
His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competi-
tively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment
under the Fourteenth Amendment.58
51. Id. at 271-72.
52. See 2 ROTUNDA, ET AL., supra note 27, at 450 ("The Bakke decision remains singular in
the depth of analysis of constitutional issues relating to affirmative action programs.").
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
54. Id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part) ("Racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
55. Id. at 411 ("[T]he question whether race can ever be used as a factor.., is not an issue
in this case . . . .") (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist invalidated the program on statutory
grounds. Id. at 408, 421.
57. Id. at 305.
58. Id. at 318. Powell's aversion to quota systems such as the one in Bakke seems to stem
from a dislike of "mass process" in which individuals are not treated as individuals, but as mem-
bers of a class. This, according to Laurence Tribe, undermines an individual's right "to be
treated by the government as a unique and not a fungible being." LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMER!-
CAN CONSTIrtmONAL LAW 1527 n.26 (2d ed. 1988). A more thorough examination of this the-
ory of rights may be found in LAURENCE H. TRmE, CONSTITUTIONAL Ctoc- s 223-28 (1985).
1996]
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As a result of the Court's splintered analysis, Bakke generated "con-
siderable unease"59 and gave little direction to courts analyzing bene-
ficial racial classifications beyond its facts.
Due to a moderate majority60 and lackluster leadership, 61 the
Burger Court continued to disagree about the proper standard of re-
view in affirmative action cases. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,62 the Court
examined the constitutionality of the "minority business enterprise"
or "MBE" provisions of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.63
The provision mandated an award of ten percent of federal funds allo-
cated to state and local public works to businesses "50% percentum of
which is [sic] owned by minority group members." 64 'vo three-justice
pluralities, writing separately, held the provision constitutional under
the equal protection provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.65 Again, the Court could not agree on the proper standard of
review. However, six justices applied some lesser standard than strict
scrutiny. Three justices applied intermediate scrutiny in examining
the provisions.6 Writing for the other three, Justice Burger's analysis
focused on "whether the objectives [of the MBE program were]
within the power of Congress... [and] whether the limited use of
racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, [was] a constitu-
tionally permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives
.. "... 67 Justice Burger's plurality opinion emphasized Congress' abil-
ity to attain its objectives through section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which acts as a "positive grant... authorizing Congress
to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. '68
Noting there is no requirement that "Congress must act in a wholly
59. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 58, at 1523.
60. See BERNARD ScHwARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 314-16 (1993).
Schwartz notes that this majority was composed of Justices White, Stewart, Powell, Blackmun,
and Stevens.
61. Id. at 312-14.
62. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
63. Pub. L. No. 95-28,91 Stat. 116 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6705), amending the Local Public
Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 6701 et seq.).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (f) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. II). The provision further defined "minority
group members" for purposes of the Act as "citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Id.
65. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 453, 517 (Marshall, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 473 (emphasis omitted).
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'color-blind' fashion" to remedy race discrimination,69 Burger found
that the MBE program "provide[d] a reasonable assurance that appli-
cation of racial.., or ethnic criteria [would] be limited to accomplish-
ing the remedial objectives of Congress ' 70  because the provisions
allowed for waiver and exemption in certain circumstances. 71 Bur-
ger's plurality explicitly rejected both standards of review forwarded
in Bakke,71 but noted that the MBE provision would survive under
either standard.73
Subsequent attempts to determine the proper standard of review
for beneficial race-based classifications proved equally daunting for
the Court. For example, only four of the five Justice majority in Wy-
gant v. Jackson Board of Education74 held that strict scrutiny was
proper where reviewing a race-based layoff protection provision for
minority teachers.75 Further, two other cases considering the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action programs judicially imposed as a rem-
edy for past discrimination begged the question; though
acknowledging the Court had "not agreed... on the proper test to be
applied in analyzing the constitutionality of race-conscious remedial
measures[,]' 76 in both Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l. As-
soc. v. EEOC77 and United States v. Paradise,7" the majorities held
"the relief ordered survives even strict scrutiny analysis."79
In 1989, after a decided shift to the political right,"0 the Court
tried to put to rest recurring questions over the proper standard of
review for affirmative action programs in City of Richmond v. J.A.
69. Id. at 482.
70. Id. at 487.
71. Id. at 487-89.
72. Id. at 492; see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271-72.
73. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
74. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
75. Id. at 274, 280.
76. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 480 (1986).
77. Id. In Sheet Metal Workers the Court considered whether Title VII's remedial provi-
sions allow courts to order race-conscious relief which may benefit persons not identified as
victims of unlawful discrimination. A splintered opinion upheld the relief ordered in this case.
Id. at 482.
78. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). Here, the Court determined race-conscious provisions imposed by
the district court of Alabama to remedy systemic discrimination against African-Americans in
the state trooper employment hierarchy did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 185.
79. Id. at 166-67; see also Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 480 (noting that regardless of the
test to be used, the practice at issue passed even strict scrutiny).
80. ScawARTz, supra note 60, at 367-369 (noting and analyzing the addition of Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas to the Court).
1996)
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Croson Co."' The plaintiffs in Croson challenged a municipal ordi-
nance requiring an award of 30 percent of city construction subcon-
tracts to minority businesses.' A five justice majority led by Justice
O'Connor agreed with the Fourth Circuit's use of strict scrutiny in
reviewing the ordinance.83 The majority found Fullilove inapposite,
and distinguished Croson from Fullilove for two reasons. First, Fulli-
love involved the "unique remedial powers of Congress under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment";' Croson, on the other hand, dealt with
remedial provisions enacted by state and local governments. The
court reasoned the States' power to enact racial classifications is lim-
ited by section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, which "stemmed
from a distrust of state legislative enactments based on race[.] '85
Congress, on the other hand, acts pursuant to "a positive grant of leg-
islative power" under section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, al-
lowing the federal government greater latitude in enacting legislation
which furthers the purpose of the Amendment.86 Accordingly, courts
should be more skeptical of state action which classifies on the basis of
race. Second, though the City of Richmond's MBE ordinance paral-
leled the flexible nature of the Congressional MBE in Fullilove, the
City's ability to enact such provisions under section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not parallel Congress' power under section
Five.87 Although the Court acknowledged state and municipal gov-
ernments may act to eliminate discrimination, 8 such actions "must...
be exercised within the constraints of §1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."89 This constitutional restraint, according to the majority, com-
pels governments to specifically "[identify] that discrimination with
the particularity required by the... Amendment" 90 in order to dispel
concerns over oppressive or inequitable use of racial classifications for
nefarious purposes.91
81. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
82. Id. at 477 (citing and discussing Ordinance No. 83-69-59, codified at RICHMOND, VA.
Crr' CODE § 12-156 (a) (1985)).
83. l at 486.
84. Id. at 488.
85. Id. at 491.
86. Id. (quoting Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651).
87. Id. at 490.
88. Id. at 491-92.
89. Id. at 492.
90. Id.
91. Id. ("It is beyond dispute that any public entity... has a compelling interest in assuring
that public dollars... do not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice.").
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Analyzing the Richmond program under strict scrutiny, the ma-
jority in Croson invalidated the municipal MBE program.92 The ma-
jority examined the factual findings of the Richmond City Council and
found the evidence presented regarding race discrimination in the
Richmond construction industry was insufficient to support a finding
of compelling governmental interest.93 According to the majority, as-
sertions of broad based societal discrimination would not establish a
compelling governmental interest,94 nor would findings of past dis-
crimination within a particular local industry.95  The majority indi-
cated the City would need to show an inference of discrimination by
establishing a nexus between a high number of qualified MBE's and a
low number of participating MBE's in the Richmond area.96 Further,
the majority found it "almost impossible to assess"97 whether the plan
could satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. The majority did indi-
cate, however, that evidence of viable race-neutral alternatives in
achieving the governmental interest or a program's use of strict nu-
merical quotas might lead to a program's demise under the second
prong of the strict scrutiny test.98
Croson finally solidified the standard of review for racial classifi-
cations of any kind at the state and local level. Fullilove's split major-
ity, combined with the Croson majority's dicta regarding section Five
92. Id. at 511.
93. Id. at 510.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 498.
96. Id. at 501-04. Here, the Court relied heavily on Title VII disparate impact jurispru-
dence, which requires a similar statistical disparity between the racial composition of the rele-
vant labor force and the employer's work force in order to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination. See Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,340 n.20 (1977) ("Sta-
tistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative ... because such imbalance is often a
tell-tale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will... result in a work force more or less representative of
the racial and ethnic composition of the population of the community from which employees are
hired."); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-651 (1989) (comparing "racial
composition of the qualified persons in the labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs"
to determine if prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination was established); see also
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (applying the same standard to estab-
lish a prima facie case of pattern or practice discrimination). For a more specific analysis, see
Michael L. Marshall, Causation in Employment Discrimination Analysis: A Proposed Marriage
of the Croson and Wards Cove Rationales, 20 U. BALT. L. REV. 307 (1991).
97. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
98. Id. at 507-08.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, left undetermined the standard of re-
view applicable to beneficial racial classifications employed by federal
actors.99
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC 00 answered that question. In
Metro Broadcasting, a five justice majority held "benign" race-based
classifications enacted by Congress satisfy the equal protection provi-
sion of the Fifth Amendment if they withstand intermediate scrutiny
and do not "impose undue burdens on non-minorities."' 10 1 In his final
opinion issued before retiring, Justice Brennan relied heavily on the
reasoning in Fullilove and dicta in Croson to support the application
of intermediate scrutiny to such provisions. 1° Noting the Court must
defer to Congress when Congress wields the powers provided it by the
Constitution,0 3 Brennan combined Congress' powers under the Com-
merce and Spending Clauses with its enforcement powers under sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to establish a broad umbrella
of congressional authority under which such classifications might ap-
propriately be invoked."° In distinguishing Croson from Metro
Broadcasting, Justice Brennan reiterated Croson's distinction between
federal and state classifications, noting the states' tendency toward en-
acting oppressive racial classifications. 0 5 The majority also under-
scored Fullilove's deference to Congress' "institutional competence as
the National Legislature.' 0 6
The Court then turned to the provisions at issue. 0 7 The first ena-
bled the FCC to take race into consideration as a "plus" in granting
new licenses only when prospective minority owners intended to ac-
tively participate in the station's management. 08 The second allowed
"distress sales" of licenses to prospective minority licensees. Sellers
99. See Cassandra D. Hart, Unresolved Tensions: The Croson Decision, 7 -ARv. BLAcK-
LETrER J. 71 (1990); John J. Hayes, Congressional Ratification of Otherwise Unconstitutional
Local Affirmative Action: Can Congress Override Croson? 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rlv. 681 (1990).
100. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
101. Id. at 597.
102. Id. at 564-66.
103. Id. at 563 (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472).
104. ld.
105. Id. at 566.
106. Id. at 563 (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490).
107. The FCC promulgated these policies acting pursuant to Congress' grant of administra-
tive authority in the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.).
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were allowed to bypass standard FCC regulations in such circum-
stances.10 9 The majority found both policies substantially related to
the important governmental objective of diversity in broadcast pro-
gramming."' The Court determined in light of the limited number of
frequencies available and the FCC's policy of ensuring diverse view-
points in broadcasting, Congress and the FCC have broad latitude in
determining who may receive stations."' Further, the Court consid-
ered Congress' and the FCC's examinations of possible "relation-
ship[s] between expanded minority ownership and greater broadcast
diversity.""' Both the FCC's findings and Congress' subsequent sup-
port of those findings were sufficient to establish the second prong of
intermediate scrutiny analysis." 3
Metro Broadcasting and Croson appeared to bring the constitu-
tional debate over the proper standard of review to a tenuous rest. In
both Croson and Metro Broadcasting, the Court considered the histor-
ical purpose and context of the Fourteenth Amendment. Taken to-
gether, the two cases seemed to create a balance between promoting
the nation's interest in encouraging substantive racial equality and
recognizing and limiting the states' historic tendency to overreach
Constitutional limits.114 However, "with five votes, anything is possi-
ble[,]' ' " 5 and the possibility this balance would last slipped away with
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and White's retirements.1' 6 Considering
the critical commentary which followed Metro Broadcasting, 7 it
seemed only a matter of time until the new conservative Court would
reconsider the issue.
109. Ld. at 557 (citing WPIX Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d at 983).
110. Id. at 566.
111. ld. at 566-67 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
112. Id. at 569.
113. Id. at 569-70.
114. See Madison infra note 221 and accompanying text.
115. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. C. L. Rlv. 1175, 1185
(1989).
116. See Scnw aTz, supra note 60.
117. See Douglas 0. Linder, Review of Affirmative Action after Metro Broadcasting v. FCC:
The Solution Almost Nobody Wanted, 59 UMKC L. REv. 293 (1991); Lucy Katz, Public Affirma-
tive Action and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Fragmentation of Theory after Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 17 T. MAR-
SHALL L. REv. 317 (1992).
1996]
13
Thompson-Schneider: Paved with Good Intentions: Affirmative Action after Adarand
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Mountain Gravel and Construction Company was awarded the
prime contract for a Colorado highway construction project in 1989.118
The contract, awarded by the Department of Transportation through
its subsidiary Central Federal Lands Highway Division, contained a
clause which provided prime contractors additional compensation for
hiring subcontractors certified as small businesses controlled by "so-
cially and economically disadvantaged individuals."1 19 The clause also
provided a presumption of social and economic disadvantage for cer-
tain racial and ethnic minorities. 120
These mandatory provisions contained in most federal agency
contracts had their origins in the Small Business Act (SBA) 121 and
regulations promulgated by the Small Business Administration. 122
They were created and implemented in an effort to further the policy
of encouraging participation of minorities in the performance of fed-
eral agency contracts. 123 Mountain Gravel's contract, awarded under
the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of
1987 (STURAA),124 adopted the SBA's definition of social and eco-
nomic disadvantage and the statutory presumptions of social and eco-
nomic disadvantage for women and racial minorities provided in the
SBA.1' Statutory requirements under the SBA and STURAA were
implemented through federal and state regulatory schemes for certify-
ing businesses owned by socially or economically disadvantaged indi-
viduals.12 6 Under both the SBA and STURAA presumptions of
economic or social disadvantage were rebuttable by third parties. 127
Mountain Gravel requested bids on a portion of the prime con-
tract from subcontractors specializing in guardrail work, and received
bids from several companies, including Adarand Constructors and
118. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. (1990 & Supp. V).
122. See, e.g., 13 CFR § 124.102 (1994).
123. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
124. Id. at 2103 (citing Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132).
125. Id. at 2103 (citing 101 Stat. 145, 146). Unlike the SBA's goal of five percent participa-
tion, STURAA set a higher goal of ten percent minority participation in federal transportation
contracts. Id. at 2102-03.
126. Id. at 2102-04.
127. Id. at 2103.
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Gonzales Construction. 2 ' Adarand's bid was the lowest submitted;129
however, Gonzales Construction had obtained certification as a small
business controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged indi-
viduals. Because of this certification, the prime contractor awarded
the subcontract to Gonzales, despite Adarand's lower bid.130
Adarand filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Colo-
rado, challenging the constitutionality of such race-based presump-
tions in federal contracts under the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment.' 3 ' The District Court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment. 32 Applying intermediate scrutiny as adopted
in Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting and holding the presumptions
valid under the Fifth Amendment, the District Court noted the pre-
sumptions "[were] supported by long standing congressional policies
related to achieving the important governmental objective of remedy-
ing discrimination.' '1 33
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.' 34 Noting "[t]he question
of congressional action was not before the Court in Croson[,]'1 35 a
three judge panel reaffirmed the vitality of Fullilove and Metro Broad-
casting's "intermediate scrutiny standard of review" when Congress
exercises its "specific constitutional mandate under section 5 to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment."' 36 The Supreme Court subse-
quently granted certiorari. 13
7
B. Issues
As a threshold question, the Court had to determine whether
Adarand had standing to assert a claim for forward looking relief.
38
The central issue presented in Adarand was whether Metro Broadcast-
ing properly adopted intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review
for federally imposed beneficial racial classifications. 39 If not, the
128. Id. at 2102.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2102.
131. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 241 (D. Colo. 1992).
132. Id. at 245.
133. Id.
134. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1539 (10th Cir. 1994).
135. Id. at 1544.
136. Id. at 1544-45.
137. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994).
138. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2104-05.
139. Id. at 2105-06.
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Court had to address the question of whether abandoning Metro
Broadcasting would depart from the principles of stare decisis. 40
IV. THE MAJoRITY's HOLDING
In a 5-4 decision the Court held any court analyzing racial classifi-
cations imposed by any governmental actor must review the provi-
sions under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
components using strict scrutiny.' 4' In so holding, the Court expressly
overruled Metro Broadcasting's use of intermediate scrutiny in re-
viewing "benign" race-based classifications, 142 and implicitly over-
ruled Fullilove's reliance on a "less rigorous standard" of review for
federal race-based classifications. 43
The majority limited the opinion's scope to explicit race-based
classifications, expressly declining to address the standard required
when reviewing facially neutral classifications having a disparate im-
pact.144 The Court also did not extend Adarand to apply to Title VII
jurisprudence, focusing solely on the constitutional issue. 45 Recogniz-
ing that the ruling "alter[ed] the playing field in some important re-
spects,"'146 the Court also refused to rule on the constitutional
propriety of the racial presumptions in dispute and instead remanded
the case to the District Court. 47 The Court did, however, specifically
point to Fullilove and Croson for guidance in determining whether the
provisions were narrowly tailored.Y4
As a threshold issue, the Court first addressed whether Adarand
had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against future
use of subcontract compensation clauses containing racial presump-
tions.' 49 Analyzing Adarand's claims under the standards enunciated
140. Id. at 2114.
141. Id. at 2113.
142. Id
143. Id. at 2117.
144. Id at 2105.
145. See id at 2105-06.
146. Id. at 2118.
147. Id. Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals had analyzed the presump-
tions under intermediate scrutiny, they had not determined whether the regulations furthered a
compelling governmental interest or whether the regulations were narrowly tailored as required
by Croson. Moreover, differences in the regulatory schemes implemented under the SBA and
STURAA were not carefully considered at the district court level. Id.
148. See id
149. Standing is a judicial term of art indicating that a "party has sufficient stake in an other-
wise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." BLAcK's LAw
DicIoNARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990). The requirement is "derived from the 'case or controversy'
requirement of Article III." OXFORD COMi'AMON, supra note 30, at 819. The doctrine consists
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in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,' the Court determined Adarand
had standing to bring the suit seeking forward looking relief.15 1
Next, in determining the proper standard of review for beneficial
federal race-based classifications, the majority's analysis of affirmative
action jurisprudence through Croson emphasized "three general pro-
positions" crucial to the majority holding: skepticism of racial classifi-
cations in general, consistency of review of all racial classifications
whether "benign" or burdensome, and congruence between Four-
teenth and Fifth Amendment equal protection analysis.152  These
three propositions, the majority asserted, compel "the conclusion that
any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any gov-
ernmental actor... justify any racial classification... under the strict-
est judicial scrutiny.' 15 3
First, the majority espoused the need for healthy skepticism of all
racial classifications. Drawing from cases presenting classifications
which benefit and burden racial groups, 5 4 the majority asserted
of a two prong inquiry; first, whether there is injury in fact to the plaintiff, and second, whether
there is a "showing of actual governmental causation of that injury." Id. at 820.
150. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Lujan involved a challenge to administrative regulations interpret-
ing section Seven of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 et seq. The plaintiffs in Lujan
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court, however, held the plaintiffs had not estab-
lished injury in fact because they had "allege[d] only an injury at some indefinite future time,"
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2, and could not show imminent injury. Similarly, in Adarand the plain-
tiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against future use of subcontractor compensation
clauses in federal contracts. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2104. The Court therefore had to consider
whether Adarand's asserted injury was sufficiently "imminent" under the standards enunciated
in Lujan. Id.
151. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105. First, Adarand had properly alleged "an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is... concrete and particularized," id. at 2104 (citing Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560), by asserting the clauses denied it equal protection of the laws. To show the harm
was particularized, the Court held Adarand needed only to show the-presumptions "prevents
[sic] (it) from competing on an equal footing," id. at 2105 (citing Ass'n. of Gen. Contractors v.
City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2304 (1993)), not that it would be the lowest bidder in the
future. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105.
Adarand had also adequately shown "imminent injury" from the use of racial presumptions
in federal contracts. The Court noted the frequency with which Adarand bids for guardrail sub-
contracts, combined with the number of federal prime contracts awarded each year in Colorado,
ensured Adarand's future participation in federal bidding would be highly likely. Id Further,
the Court found Adarand's competition for such contracts would often include certified small
disadvantaged businesses. Id. These factors combined led the court to believe Adarand would
likely be harmed "sometime in the relatively near future," providing adequate risk of harm to
confer standing to Adarand. hL
152. Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2111.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2111 (See, eg., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Fulliove, 448 U.S. 488 (1980); Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)).
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"some heightened level of scrutiny"15 should apply to beneficial ra-
cial classifications. In comparing Metro Broadcasting to these previ-
ous cases, the majority determined Metro Broadcasting's adoption of
intermediate scrutiny when reviewing benign racial classifications im-
properly treated "certain ... classifications ... less skeptically than
others,"'56 thus undermining the principle of skepticism.
Second, the majority emphasized the need for consistency in the
standard of review in all cases in which racial classifications are im-
posed, regardless of who is burdened or benefitted. Citing Bakke and
Croson for support, the majority held the Metro Broadcasting stan-
dard inapposite, since "the race of the benefitted group" determined
the proper standard of review.' 5 7 Noting that equal protection rights
inure in individuals, the Court held Metro Broadcasting's standard of
review improper because it allows group classifications based on race,
"classification[s] long recognized as 'in most circumstances irrelevant
",.158
Finally, the majority underscored prior Court holdings equating
equal protection analysis under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 59 Metro Broadcasting's less stringent analysis of race-based
classifications under the Fifth Amendment "squarely rejected" the
concept of congruence established by previous Fifth Amendment case
law.' 6
0
The majority finally determined abandoning Metro Broadcasting
did not improperly depart from the doctrine of stare decisis.161 Noting
the principles of skepticism, consistency, and congruence "stood for
an 'embracing' and 'intrinsically soun[d]' understanding of equal pro-
tection,"' 62 the Court determined Metro Broadcasting's holding was
inconsistent with such past understanding of equal protection jurispru-
dence. The majority reasoned departure from Metro Broadcasting's
standard of review would not require an abrupt change in peoples'
155. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105.
156. Id. at 2112.
157. Id. at 2111-12.
158. Id. at 2112 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
159. Id. at 2111. See eg., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
160. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112.
161. Id. at 2114-17.
162. Id. at 2115.
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daily conduct. 63 Nor had people come to rely on Metro Broadcast-
ing's standard of review in ordering their lives."6 These considera-
tions led the majority to conclude the interest in maintaining an
"intrinsically sounder doctrine" outweighed the benefits of adhering
to precedent. 65
V. ANALYSis
Although the majority in Adarand rejected the "surface ap-
peal"'166 of analyzing preferential racial classifications under a less
stringent standard than strict scrutiny, the question remains whether
the appealingly simple solution of strict scrutiny applied across the
board can itself survive strict scrutiny. After analyzing equal protec-
tion jurisprudence prior to Croson, the majority asserted applying
strict scrutiny to all racial classifications does not "depart from the
fabric of the law .... ,,167 However, the majority's interpretation of
equal protection analysis fails to address important historical and
precedential concerns in determining the standard of review for fed-
eral beneficial racial classifications."6 As a result, the majority opin-
ion decontextualizes the Fourteenth Amendment, effectively stripping
it of its historical power and purpose.1 69
A. In Promoting Skepticism, the Court Unnecessarily Assumed
Strict Scrutiny to Be the Proper Standard of Review
The majority asserted its examination of pre-Croson equal pro-
tection cases clearly suggest skepticism as an overarching theme when
analyzing any racial classification and cites to the Japanese internment
and relocation cases170 as well as Wygant171 and Fullilove72 as support
for this proposition. As Justice Stevens concedes in his dissent, this
163. Id. at 2116.
164. Id. at 2115-16. Here, the Court paid lip service to its discussion of stare decisis in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
165. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2115.
166. Id. at 2112.
167. Id. at 2116.
168. See discussion infra part IV (A-C).
169. "[C]onstitutional test[s] ... under the equal protection clause should ... be contextually
sensitive to relevant factors of history, culture, and dominant political motivation. The test of
dominant political motivation... must be interpreted against the background of a history... of
moral degradation .... " DAVm A. J. RICHARDs, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITTION 176
(1993).
170. See supra note 31.
171. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267.
172. Fulliove, 448 U.S. 448.
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section of the majority's analysis is "in principle, a good statement of
law and of common sense." 173
Implementing strict scrutiny when reviewing beneficial racial
classifications does not necessarily follow from the majority's need for
skeptical review of racial classifications, however. Though the cases
relied upon by the majority invoke some level of heightened scrutiny
for all racial classifications, only those which involve review of detri-
mental racial classifications invoke strict scrutiny as the proper stan-
dard of review. 74 Moreover, the majority's reliance on pre-Croson
affirmative action cases to support this finding underscores the
Court's inability to agree on a standard of review for beneficial race-
based classifications. For example, the majority cited Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education to establish this proposition; however, only a
plurality in Wygant forwarded strict scrutiny as the proper standard of
review.175 Further, the majority cited Fullilove as support for impos-
ing strict scrutiny, but neglected to note six justices forwarded some-
thing less than strict scrutiny of review in that case.176  Therefore,
though pre-Croson cases "always have employed a more stringent
standard"'177 than rational basis review for beneficial racial classifica-
tions, the heightened scrutiny employed by the court in previous cases
do not definitively compel the use of strict scrutiny in the instant case.
B. In Promoting Consistency, the Court Decontextualized the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Strict
Scrutiny
In Adarand, the majority indicated that the use of strict scrutiny
was also compelled by its finding in Croson that "the standard of re-
view under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race
of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification.' 178 An-
alyzing all racial classifications under strict judicial scrutiny, the ma-
jority noted, would impose a consistent analysis of all such
classifications. 179 Consistent review of all group race classifications
would thereby protect the individual's right to equal protection of the
law.18 0
173. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. See id at 2111 and text accompanying note 159.
175. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274, 280 and text accompanying notes 74-75.
176. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453, 517, 519 and text accompanying notes 65-66.
177. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279.
178. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94).
179. Id at 2112-13.
180. Id at 2114.
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In promoting consistency of review, however, the majority failed
to recognize the Court's historical distinction in equal protection juris-
prudence between classifications which act as "a No Trespassing sign"
and those which symbolize a "welcome mat."'181 By disregarding this
distinction, the majority effectively stripped from the equal protection
clause and the concept of strict scrutiny their historical and legal
power as tools used specifically to protect "those groups in society
which have occupied, as a consequence of widespread insistent preju-
dice against them, the position of perennial losers in the political
struggle."'"
The Fourteenth Amendment's protections and restrictions cannot
be separated from the historical and social environment from which
they evolved. 8 3 After a brutal civil war which ripped the country
apart, Congress recognized the need to reject the constitutional impri-
matur of slavery and racism. In enacting and adopting the Civil War
Amendments,"8 Congress and the States attempted to dispel the legal
and social distinctions slavery placed on African-Americans as a
group.'8 5 As a result, subsequent legislative186 and judicial'8 7 actions
181. Id. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 58, at 1453-54.
183. See, e.g., Henry Steele Commager, Historical Background of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, in THm FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 14-28 (Bernard Schwartz, ed. 1970); JACOBUS TEN-
BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); see also Eric
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA.
L. REv. 753 (1985). For a fascinating article discussing the increased use of historical analysis in
Fourteenth Amendment litigation, see Peter Charles Hoffer, 'Blind to History' - The Use of
History in Affirmative Action Suits: Another Look at City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 23
RUTGERS L.J. 271 (1992).
184. Also known as the Reconstruction Amendments, these three amendments
are the most important amendments to the U.S. Constitution since the Bill of Rights of
1791. They include the Thirteenth Amendment (ratified in 1865) ... the Fourteenth
Amendment (ratified in 1868) ... and the Fifteenth Amendment (ratified in 1870) ....
[They] constitute, as a unit, the ultimate constitutional resolution of the long constitu-
tional crisis that culminated in secession and the American Civil War of 1861-1865.
RicHARDs, supra note 169, at 6.
185. Such as the denial of U.S. citizenship to African-Americans in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. 393, 407 (1856), where African-Americans were described as "beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so
far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect .... "
186. For example, the Freedmen's Bureau was established by Congress in 1865 specifically to
help newly freed slaves adapt to post-Civil War society. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507
(1866). Other legislative programs are considered in Schnapper, supra note 183, at 754-84.
187. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36,71-72 (1872) ("[O]n the most casual examination
of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in them all.... we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman .... Both the
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recognized the Fourteenth Amendment's primary purpose as a vehicle
for establishing group remedies for recently freed African-Americans.
Although Jim Crow laws emerged as an unfortunate product of the
backlash against these provisions,88 the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment understood its provisions to allow remedial group classi-
fications which benefitted African Americans in some
circumstances. 8 9
Further, the concept of strict scrutiny was similarly spawned in an
attempt to distinguish classifications which burden minority groups
from other less invidious classifications. In United States v. Carolene
Products Co.,19° Justice Stone reserved for later decision an issue
which would become the vehicle for the Court's subsequent develop-
ment of strict scrutiny analysis.' 9' According to Stone, "[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition...
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial scru-
tiny"' 92 in order to protect such groups from political decisions which
unduly burden them. This famous footnote developed into a theory of
judicial review which required extremely close examination of "sus-
pect" classifications, 93 generally defined as those classifications which
burden a group based on race or ancestry. 194
In examining governmental classifications which burden racial
groups, the Court has historically relied on several factors to deter-
mine whether strict scrutiny applies. First, the Court has consistently
required a showing of intent to burden the racial group classified;
state action which merely affects racial groups in a discriminatory pat-
tern absent a showing of intent to burden those groups will not invoke
188. Jim Crow encompassed both explicit laws restricting African-Americans legally and so-
cially, such as the practice at issue in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as well as facially
neutral laws which adversely impacted African-Americans, such as grandfather clauses, poll
taxes, and literacy requirements. BERNARD R. BoxnL±, BLACKS AND SOCIAL Jusricu 49 (1984).
189. See Schnapper, supra note 183, at 754 ("[R]ace-conscious Reconstruction programs
were enacted concurrently with the fourteenth amendment and were supported by the same
legislators who favored the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. This history strongly
suggests that the framers of the amendment could not have intended it... to prohibit affirmative
action for blacks or other disadvantaged groups.").
190. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
191. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087-88
(1982).
192. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
193. The Court also applies strict scrutiny review to those classifications which obstruct or
hinder the exercise of a fundamental right. TRIBE, AmincAN CONsTrrITUONAL LAW, supra note
58, at 1451. For a discussion of fundamental rights theory, see iL at 1454-57.
194. Id. at 1465-66.
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application of strict judicial scrutiny.195 Second, when a class exhibits
immutable characteristics, or a pattern of prejudice against a class ex-
ists, the Court has imposed a more rigorous level of scrutiny for classi-
fications negatively affecting such classes. 196 Third, the Court has held
that where a classification brands an excluded class as inferior, strict
scrutiny is the more proper standard of review.197
In determining whether it should apply strict scrutiny to benefi-
cial racial classifications, Adarand's majority completely ignored the
first and second factors and improperly focused on the group benefit-
ted in applying the third. First, Adarand clearly could not show any
governmental intent to burden anyone. The only evidence of intent
Adarand provided involved the SBA's policy to encourage the partici-
pation of minorities. 9 8 Adarand could neither show intent to burden
the minorities classified by the race-based presumptions nor discrimi-
natory intent to burden the nonminorities excluded by the classifica-
tions, because discriminatory intent focuses on classifications which
are made "because of, not merely in spite of"'9 9 their adverse effect.
Further, Adarand did not attempt to show, and the Court did not con-
sider, whether Adarand's immutable non-minority status contributed
to the negative impact of the SBA presumptions, or whether
Adarand's owners could prove their non-minority status had been the
basis of historical prejudice. Finally, the Court did consider the effect
of stigmatic harm in Adarand; however, unlike prior cases where the
Court considered whether stigma attached to the groups excluded
from participation or benefits by the classification, the majority in-
stead considered the stigmatic harm to the classified group receiving
the benefits.2 00 The majority in Adarand did not consider whether
non-minorities excluded under the SBA presumptions would suffer
stigmatic harm, and also ignored prior determinations by the Court
195. See, eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The
requirement of purposeful discrimination is a common thread running through the cases [in
equal protection jurisprudence]."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) ("Our analysis
begins with the basic principle that a [person] who alleges an equal protection violation has the
burden of proving 'the existence of purposeful discrimination."') (quoting Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
196. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,684-86 (1973); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (A "traditional indicia of suspectness" includes class which
has been "subjected to ... a history of purposeful unequal treatment.").
197. See Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see also United Jewish
Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,165 (1977) (use of race "represented no racial
slur or stigma with respect to [the excluded] whites .....
198. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
199. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
200. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13.
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that questions of harm to non-minorities caused by beneficial racial
classifications should be left to the legislature.2° '
By applying strict scrutiny to beneficial racial classifications with-
out requiring a showing of any of these factors, the Court inherently
redefined discriminatory intent as simply an intent to classify accord-
ing to race. This definition departs from the historical understanding
of discriminatory intent as one to burden, stigmatize, or harm a partic-
ular racial group.2°2 Moreover, using this definition the majority indi-
rectly applied strict scrutiny review to classifications having only a
harmful effect, an analysis generally prohibited by the Court.20 3
Finally, as Justice Stevens noted in dissent, by applying strict scru-
tiny to beneficial racial classifications at the federal level the Adarand
majority "risks sacrificing common sense at the altar of formal consis-
tency.' '204 Imposing strict scrutiny review for all racial classifications
at all levels actually results in inconsistency of review between benefi-
cial race classifications and other beneficial group classifications. For
example, the Court imposes intermediate scrutiny when reviewing
beneficial gender classifications, 20 5 and only requires rational basis re-
view of policies which benefit Native Americans20 6 and veterans. 20 7
Ironically, the Court's holding results in inconsistency of analysis of
classifications which distribute benefits to different minority groups
while imposing the most heavy burden on beneficial classifications to
the group most oppressed historically.
201. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484-87.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 196-199.
203. See supra text accompanying note 194.
204. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding Title VII chal-
lenges to gender based classifications must withstand intermediate scrutiny). See also Concrete
Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995) (holding intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard of review
where analyzing gender based state and local affirmative action programs). But see Brunet v.
City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390,403-04 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1190 (1994) (relying
on Croson in applying strict scrutiny to beneficial gender based classifications).
206. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,554 (1974) (applying rational basis review to beneficial
hiring policies for members of federally recognized tribes because "Indians [are not] a discrete
racial group, but ... members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities").
207. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, 281.
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C. In Promoting Congruence, the Court Ignored Important
Considerations Based on Federalism
The Adarand majority applied strict scrutiny to federal race-
based classifications in part to foster congruent analysis of equal pro-
tection questions under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. °8
The majority relied primarily on Boiling v. Sharpe,2 09 a companion
case to Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka,210 which established the
equal protection provision of the Fifth Amendment provided the
same rights to schoolchildren in the District of Columbia as the Four-
teenth Amendment provided to all other African-American school-
children.2 1 ' However, the majority's assertion overlooked "important
practical and legal differences between federal and state and local
decisionmakers."212
First, the majority refused to acknowledge section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment may provide Congress greater latitude in en-
acting provisions such as those at issue in Adarand 13 Section Five
explicitly provides Congress with the power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive provisions through appropriate legisla-
tion,214 and the Court has interpreted it to permit Congress to define
the substantive guarantees of the Amendment. 5 This expansion of
federal power under the Amendment, coupled with section One's re-
strictions on states, in effect forced "a dramatic change in the balance
208. See notes 40-108 and accompanying text.
209. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
210. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
211. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 498-500.
212. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. See generally Matt Pawa, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can
Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L.
REv. 1029 (1993); Rex E. Lee, Missing Pieces: A Commentary on Choper, 72 IowA L. REv. 275,
280 (1987). Lee states:
Whatever limitations section one of the fourteenth amendment imposes on the reme-
dial ability of state governments to give benefits based on racial classifications, section
five of that amendment changes the considerations for evaluating the propriety of ac-
tion by Congress. Section five represents a deliberate decision on the part of the Con-
stitution makers that Congress should have a greater measure of discretion in
determining the extent to which this Nation's preferences and advantages should be
distributed....
Rex E. Lee, Missing Pieces: A Commentary on Choper, 72 IowA L. REv. 275, 280 (1987).
214. Section Five provides that "Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
215. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, (1966); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226, 243 n.18 (1983) ("Congress need [not] recite the words 'section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amend-
ment' or 'equal protection,"' if the Court can discern some legislative purpose or factual predi-
cate that supports the exercise of that power.) But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
(holding that amendment authorizing 18 year-olds to vote in state and local elections was be-
yond power of Congress to enact).
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between congressional and state power over matters of race. '21 6 Until
Adarand, the Court had recognized and incorporated this understand-
ing of section Five in its affirmative action jurisprudence. In both Ful-
lilove and Metro Broadcasting, a majority of justices pointed to the
interaction of section One and section Five in determining the proper
standard of review for federal race-based classifications.217 Even the
Croson Court noted the significance of section Five in distinguishing
Croson from Fullilove.218 In Adarand, however, the majority simply
dismissed the impact of section Five; though "various Members of this
Court [had previously] taken different views of the authority § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with the prob-
lem of racial discrimination," the majority concluded "[w]e need not
... address these differences today."219
Further, the majority's opinion overlooks the distinction made by
the framers of the Constitution between federal and state government
in establishing a federalist system. Steeped in the "social reality and
governmental theory"' ' 0 prevalent at the time of the framing,
Madison and the Founding Fathers understood the dangers inherent
in small governmental units and established a strong federal govern-
ment to protect against those abuses.2 1 Slavery, however, remained
the weak link in Madison's strong federal system,2 and the constitu-
tional compromise so carefully struck at the time of the framing grad-
ually unravelled as the new nation grew.2z  The resulting "second
216. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490.
217. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 487; Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547.
218. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 491.
219. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
220. Croson, 488 U.S. at 522 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
221. See THm FEDERAL.ST No. 10, at 46-47 (James Madison) (WJ. Ashley ed., 1911).
Madison stated:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals com-
posing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more
easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens;
or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.... Hence, it clearly appears,
that the advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of
faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic[.]
Id.
222. See RicARaDs, supra note 169, at 25 (noting Madison's struggle with slavery as a bal-
ance between slaveowners' property interests and the restrictions on African-American liberty).
223. See Commager, supra note 183, at 21-22.
[Vol. 31:611
26
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 3, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss3/12
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER ADARAND
revolution" 4 shook federalism to its core, and encouraged Congress
to reconsider the Framers' concerns about oppression at the state gov-
ernmental level. The resulting Civil War Amendments, particularly
the Fourteenth Amendment, "was proposed and approved... to quiet
any constitutional doubt about national power" 5 to eliminate racial
discrimination.
Croson and Metro Broadcasting together reflected this under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose. The Croson ma-
jority specifically recognized the Amendment's role in "chang[ing]...
the balance between congressional and state power over matters of
race[,]"'226 and required state and local governments to meet the most
stringent standard when using race to classify for any purpose. Metro
Broadcasting's majority, relying on Croson's dicta, further under-
scored this distinction and required a less stringent standard of review
when examining benign racial classifications enacted by the federal
government. 27 The Croson and Metro Broadcasting majorities, as
well as the Framers, underscored the important difference between
actions undertaken by inherently factional state governments and a
more unified federal government.22s The Adarand majority, however,
declined to consider this extremely important historical distinction; in-
deed, as Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the majority offered "not a
word of direct explanation for its sudden and enormous
departure[.]" 229
VI. ADARAND'S IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACT
"Strict scrutiny expresses a mood; it doesn't decide a case."" 0
This statement, made shortly after Adarand was handed down, pin-
points the two most disturbing concepts underlying the opinion. First,
strict scrutiny as enunciated by the Court in Adarand certainly does
not decide a case. Prior decisions involving federal beneficial racial
classifications have not analyzed such provisions using strict scru-
tiny,231 and Adarand itself gives very little guidance.23 2 Even applica-
tion of Adarand's "strict scrutiny" test to the provisions at issue in
224. See RicaHADs, supra note 169, at 108.
225. See id. at 126-27.
226. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490.
227. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 490.
228. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 2125.
230. Kenneth Karst, quoted in Kenneth Jost, After Adarand, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 70, 71.
231. Except Croson, 448 U.S. at 490-92 and text accompanying notes 85-88.
232. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
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Adarand was delegated to the lower courts.2 33 Therefore, questions
remain regarding Adarand's impact on affirmative action jurispru-
dence and the "strict scrutiny" test itself. Further, Adarand's imposi-
tion of strict scrutiny in all affirmative action cases also without doubt
evokes a mood. Taken together with several of last term's opinions,
Adarand indicates the Court will no longer hold itself out as a sympa-
thetic forum for advocacy of race issues.
A. Adarand Will Encourage Protracted Litigation
In theory, the majority in Adarand proposes a simple solution to
a complex problem; courts must simply apply strict scrutiny analysis to
federal programs challenged in order to determine their validity. The
majority's imprimatur, however, answers none of the several ques-
tions implicitly raised by the opinion.3 4 What constitutes a compel-
ling governmental interest and what types of programs will meet the
narrow tailoring requirement of Adarand are questions not addressed
by the majority; moreover, it is unclear whether the test itself will
retain its vigor and create a formidable hurdle which such programs
must overcome, or become a watered-down version in such circum-
stances. A brief overview of existing case law indicates the answers to
these questions will not come easily, and only after much examination
by lower federal courts.
1. Compelling Governmental Interests
The Court's affirmative action jurisprudence indicates that a gov-
ernmental program may further two types of compelling governmen-
tal interests: remedial235 and non-remedial.3 6  Programs which
further remedial interests generally do not fare well with the Court,
simply because the Court has imposed such a heavy burden of proof
regarding the need for group relief in such circumstances.-3 7 One cru-
cial question Adarand left unanswered is whether the Court will con-
sider post-enactment evidence of discrimination in determining
whether remedial interests furthered by a program are compelling.2 3 8
233. See id. at 2106.
234. Jost, supra note 230, at 71.
235. These include the interests in remedying past discrimination forwarded in Croson and
Paradise. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 367-69.
236. These interests include creating diversity in classrooms and in broadcasting. See Bakke,
438 U.S. at 311-12; Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 566.
237. See Croson, 448 U.S. at 510. But see Paradise, 480 U.S. 167-69.
238. Walter Dellinger, Memorandum to General Counsels, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of
Legal Counsel, June 28, 1995, p. 2.
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Lower courts considering the issue have consistently allowed the use
of post-enactment evidence,2 9 reading Croson's requirement that
governments "identify [past] discrimination... with some specific-
ity '240 liberally.241 In order to ensure consistent analysis of remedial
governmental interests, the Court will ultimately have to determine
whether and for what purposes post-enactment evidence may be used
in affirmative action litigation.
Cases indicate forward looking programs which further non-re-
medial governmental interests in a more inclusive and diversified soci-
ety may surprisingly be more likely to survive this prong of the strict
scrutiny analysis. Adarand certainly does not preclude the use of such
non-remedial governmental interests, and both Bakke and Metro
Broadcasting specifically indicated non-remedial interests would sup-
port the first prong of equal protection analysis.242 However, in other
cases, most notably Wygant and Croson, the Court specifically rejects
diversity as a proper governmental interest.243 These conflicts may in-
dicate non-remedial interests will only be seriously examined when
fundamental Constitutional rights are implicated,2' or may simply de-
rive from the Court's previous confusion coupled with Adarand's
brevity. Whatever the cause of the conflict, the need for resolution
will probably eventually prompt the Court to act. Since two of the
nine Justices currently sitting have indicated there can never be a gov-
ernmental interest compelling enough to permit any racial classifica-
tion,245 this loophole may close as well.
2. Narrow Tailoring
The Adarand majority specifically instructed lower courts to ex-
amine Croson and Fullilove in determining whether the narrow tailor-
ing requirement had been met.2' Those pre-Adarand cases indicate
239. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1521
(10th Cir. 1994); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991); Harrison and
Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1992); Contractors Ass'n. V.
City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993).
240. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
241. See Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521 ("[We do not read Croson's evidentiary require-
ment as foreclosing the consideration of post-enactment evidence.").
242. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12; Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 566.
243. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76; Croson, 448 U.S. at 496-99.
244. Both Justices Brennan and Powell appeared to rely heavily on First Amendment consid-
erations in Bakke and Metro Broadcasting. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15; Metro Broadcasting,
497 U.S. at 566-69.
245. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19 (Scalia and Thomas, J.J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
246. Id. at 2118.
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several factors which will likely be considered in determining whether
the classifications are narrowly tailored to further the government's
interest. Courts should consider whether there are race-neutral alter-
natives to the program examined,247 whether the program is limited in
its scope and contains exemption and waiver provisions,4 whether
the program is reviewed periodically and implemented for a limited
time period,249 and whether the program unduly burdens innocent
parties.250 Questions remain regarding how the courts should apply
these factors. The Court did not indicate whether a minimal showing
must be made on all factors, or whether some factors should be
weighted more heavily than others. Nor did the Court consider
whether and to what extent the difference between remedial and non-
remedial interests forwarded by the government may affect the rele-
vant factors considered in examining the program. Such vagueness
will likely result in confusion and conflict in the lower courts, and the
Court will again be required to revisit affirmative action.
3. Fatal in Fact?
In Adarand, the majority took great pains to attempt "to dispel
the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' 251
As a guide to the proper application of strict scrutiny to beneficial
racial classifications, this dicta may have more practical effect than the
rest of the opinion.' 2 Although the use of strict scrutiny when re-
viewing harmful racial classifications will certainly foreshadow their
demise, application of the same standard to beneficial racial classifica-
tions at the state and local level has not resulted in across the board
invalidity.2 3 Given the majority's reluctance to indicate whether sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment has any significant impact on
247. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
248. Id.; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 487.
249. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490.
250. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
251. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519).
252. See Marcia Coyle, Is A Kinder And Gentler Strict Scrutiny in the Cards? NAT'L L.J.,
June 26, 1995, at A16, col. 1.
253. Several state and/or local affirmative action programs have survived strict scrutiny. See
Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990) cert. denied 498 U.S. 983
(1990); Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994); Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Coalition for Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991). See generally Janna
D. Peters, In Croson's Wake - The Eleventh Circuit Weakens the Application of Strict Scrutiny
to State and Local Affirmative Action Plans, 20 STMSON L. REv. 1013 (1991); Nicole Duncan,
Croson Revisited A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM.
Rrs. L. REv. 679 (1995).
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the amount of deference properly accorded Congressional action," 4
the majority's assertion may lead to a less vigorous application of the
strict scrutiny analysis where beneficial classifications are challenged.
B. In Adarand and Other Cases This Term the Court Indicated It
Will Be a Less Sympathetic Forum for Race Issues
Though the majority asserted Adarand's holding will not bar gov-
ernment from acting to erase the "unfortunate reality"5 5 of racial dis-
crimination in American society, the Court's track record throughout
the 1995-96 term indicates the palliative nature of that statement.
Throughout the term, the Court rode roughshod over several remedial
structures the Warren and Burger Courts implemented to neutralize
the effects of racial discrimination. 56 Adarand and Croson will at
least limit the future implementation of affirmative action programs;
at worst, they signal the demise of most existing programs.2 57 Mis-
souri v. Jenkins 58 further limited the power of federal courts to con-
struct and implement desegregation plans, and in Miller v. Johnson2"9
the Court invalidated Georgia's Congressional redistricting plans.
The "unhappy persistence"2 60 of racism in substantially all facets of
American life obviously carried little force with last term's Court. In-
stead, it simply turned a color blind eye to the reality of race's
impact.26'
VII. CONCLUSION
Theoretically, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena simply aligned
the standard of review imposed on federal, state and local affirmative
action programs. Promoting the idyllic vision of a color blind
America, the Court championed the values of skepticism, consistency
and congruence in affirmative action jurisprudence. However, in its
254. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
255. Id. at 2117.
256. ScmvAuRz, supra note 60, at 276-78, 322-25.
257. See discussion supra part VI (A).
258. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
259. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
260. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
261. See Adam Winkler, Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28
Loy. L.A. L. Rnv. 923, 925 (1995) ("The Court presumes the institutions and institutional prac-
tices it defers to are neutral, natural, and necessary, failing to recognize how those structures are
themselves the product of a contingent social context.... Consequently, the Court does not
notice how the general attitudes of prejudice and racism in society infect and infiltrate the very
institutions to which the Court defers.").
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search for consistent answers, the Court overlooked the changing na-
ture of the question. Easy law is rarely good law, particularly when
divorced from the society in which it functions, and in Adarand the
Court failed to recognize the important role of history and society in
shaping American race relations. In doing so, the Court raised more
questions than it answered, and ultimately will have to grapple with
the issue again in order to clarify the proper application of strict scru-
tiny to such programs. Ironically, by ignoring history in Adarand, the
Supreme Court is destined to repeat it.
Donna Thompson-Schneider
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